Agent skill
dependency-audit
Quellcode ansehen: coreyhaines31/cybersecurity-skills
Installation
npx skills add coreyhaines31/cybersecurity-skills --skill dependency-audit34
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Dependency Audit — Framework, Package, and Toolchain Security
Audit project dependencies, frameworks, language runtimes, and dev tools for known vulnerabilities (CVEs), security anti-patterns, and supply chain risks.
Methodology
Step 1: Inventory the Stack
Identify everything in use — not just direct dependencies but the full chain:
Package manifests — read and catalog:
Node/JS: package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml
Python: requirements.txt, Pipfile.lock, pyproject.toml, poetry.lock
Ruby: Gemfile, Gemfile.lock
Go: go.mod, go.sum
Rust: Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock
Java: pom.xml, build.gradle
PHP: composer.json, composer.lock
.NET: *.csproj, packages.configFramework and runtime versions:
- Check framework version (Next.js, Django, Rails, Spring, Laravel, Express, etc.)
- Check language/runtime version (Node.js, Python, Ruby, Go, Java, PHP, .NET)
- Check infrastructure tools (Docker base images, Terraform providers, Kubernetes versions)
Dev tools and CI/CD:
- Check CI/CD pipeline configs (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, Jenkinsfile)
- Check pre-commit hooks, linters, formatters
- Check container base images and their update status
- Check IaC tool versions (Terraform, Pulumi, CDK)
Step 2: Run Automated Audit Tools
Run the appropriate audit command for the project:
# Node.js
npm audit
npm audit --json # For structured output
# Python
pip audit # If pip-audit installed
safety check # If safety installed
# Ruby
bundle audit
# Go
govulncheck ./...
# Rust
cargo audit
# PHP
composer audit
# .NET
dotnet list package --vulnerable
# Docker
docker scout cves <image>
trivy image <image>
# General (if Trivy is available)
trivy fs .Step 3: Research Framework-Specific Known Issues
Beyond CVEs in packages, check for known vulnerability patterns specific to the framework in use. Search for recent advisories and common misconfiguration issues.
Next.js / React:
- Server Actions exposing internal endpoints (pre-14.1.1 middleware bypass CVE-2025-29927)
dangerouslySetInnerHTMLwithout sanitization- SSRF through image optimization (
next/imagewith unrestricted domains) - Exposed
.envfiles in public directory or client bundle (NEXT_PUBLIC_prefix leaking secrets) - Middleware auth bypass patterns — check middleware.ts matches all protected routes
- Server Component / Client Component boundary leaking server-only data
- Outdated
next.config.jssecurity headers
Django:
- DEBUG=True in production
- ALLOWED_HOSTS misconfigured (wildcard
*) - Missing CSRF middleware or
@csrf_exempton state-changing views - Raw SQL via
extra(),raw(), orRawSQLwithout parameterization - Pickle deserialization in sessions (use JSON serializer)
- Secret key committed to source control
Rails:
- Mass assignment without strong parameters
- SQL injection via
where("column = '#{input}'") - Unpatched Action Pack, Action View, or Active Record CVEs
- Insecure deserialization in cookies (verify secret_key_base rotation)
- CSRF token bypass in API-only mode
Express / Node.js:
- Prototype pollution through
Object.assign,lodash.merge,deep-extend - ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) in validation patterns
- Path traversal through
req.paramsin file serving routes - Missing rate limiting on auth endpoints
eval()orFunction()with user input- Event loop blocking with synchronous operations
Spring / Java:
- Spring4Shell and related RCE vulnerabilities
- Deserialization attacks (Java native serialization, Jackson polymorphic types)
- SpEL injection in Spring Expression Language
- Missing CSRF protection on state-changing endpoints
- Actuator endpoints exposed without authentication
Laravel / PHP:
- APP_DEBUG=true in production (leaks env vars in error pages)
- SQL injection via raw DB queries without bindings
- Mass assignment without
$fillable/$guarded - File upload without type validation (PHP execution via uploaded .php)
- Insecure deserialization in queued jobs
WordPress:
- Outdated core, theme, or plugin versions (most common attack vector)
- File editor enabled in wp-admin (allows code injection if admin is compromised)
- XML-RPC enabled (brute force amplification, SSRF)
- Default admin username, weak passwords
- Unpatched plugin vulnerabilities (check WPScan database)
Step 4: Check for Supply Chain Risks
Beyond known CVEs, look for supply chain attack indicators:
Dependency confusion / substitution:
- Private package names that could be claimed on public registries
- Missing
.npmrcorpip.confscoping to private registry - No lockfile integrity verification
Typosquatting:
- Package names that are close misspellings of popular packages
- Recently published packages with very few downloads
- Packages that changed ownership recently
Malicious packages:
- Postinstall scripts that make network requests or execute code (
scripts.postinstallin package.json) - Packages with obfuscated code
- Excessive permission requests relative to functionality
Maintenance risk:
- Unmaintained packages (no commits in 2+ years, archived repos)
- Single-maintainer packages for critical functionality
- Packages with known but unpatched vulnerabilities (maintainer unresponsive)
Lockfile integrity:
- Is the lockfile committed to source control?
- Does CI install from the lockfile (
npm cinotnpm install,pip install --require-hashes)? - Are integrity hashes present and verified?
Step 5: Check Dev Tool and CI/CD Security
GitHub Actions:
pull_request_targettrigger with checkout of PR code (code injection risk)- Secrets accessible in forked PR workflows
- Unpinned action versions (
uses: actions/checkout@mainvs@v4.1.0or SHA pin) - Script injection via
${{ github.event.issue.title }}inrun:blocks
Docker:
- Running as root in container (missing
USERdirective) - Base image with known CVEs (check with
trivyordocker scout) - Secrets baked into image layers (visible via
docker history) latesttag instead of pinned version
Terraform / IaC:
- Hardcoded secrets in
.tffiles - Unpinned provider versions
- Missing state file encryption
- Over-permissive IAM in provider configuration
Output Format
# Dependency & Stack Security Audit
## Project: [name]
## Stack: [language, framework, key tools]
## Date: [date]
### Stack Inventory
| Component | Version | Latest | Status |
|-----------|---------|--------|--------|
### Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
| Package | Installed | Vuln | Severity | CVE | Fix Version |
|---------|-----------|------|----------|-----|-------------|
### Framework-Specific Issues
#### [SEVERITY] [Title]
**Component:** [framework/tool name and version]
**Issue:** [description]
**Evidence:** [code or config snippet]
**Remediation:** [specific fix]
### Supply Chain Risks
| Risk | Package/Component | Details | Remediation |
|------|-------------------|---------|-------------|
### Dev Tool / CI Security
| Tool | Issue | Severity | Remediation |
|------|-------|----------|-------------|
### Prioritized Action Plan
1. [Critical — actively exploited CVEs, RCE vulnerabilities]
2. [High — known CVEs with public exploits, supply chain risks]
3. [Medium — framework misconfigurations, outdated dependencies]
4. [Low — maintenance risks, best practice improvements]Boundaries
- Only audit code and configurations the user provides
- When identifying CVEs, verify they apply to the actual installed version
- Provide specific fix versions or remediation steps for every finding
- Note when a vulnerability requires specific conditions to exploit (reducing effective severity)
- Refuse to help exploit found vulnerabilities against unauthorized targets
References
- OWASP Dependency-Check
- National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- GitHub Advisory Database
- Snyk Vulnerability Database
- npm audit / pip-audit / bundler-audit documentation
- SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) framework
Verwandte Skills
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So verwenden Sie diesen Skill
- 1
Install dependency-audit by running
npx skills add coreyhaines31/cybersecurity-skills --skill dependency-auditin your project directory. Führen Sie den obigen Installationsbefehl in Ihrem Projektverzeichnis aus. Die Skill-Datei wird von GitHub heruntergeladen und in Ihrem Projekt platziert. - 2
Keine Konfiguration erforderlich. Ihr KI-Agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf usw.) erkennt installierte Skills automatisch und nutzt sie als Kontext bei der Code-Generierung.
- 3
Der Skill verbessert das Verständnis Ihres Agenten für dependency-audit, und hilft ihm, etablierte Muster zu befolgen, häufige Fehler zu vermeiden und produktionsreifen Code zu erzeugen.
Was Sie erhalten
Skills sind Klartext-Anweisungsdateien — kein ausführbarer Code. Sie kodieren Expertenwissen über Frameworks, Sprachen oder Tools, das Ihr KI-Agent liest, um seine Ausgabe zu verbessern. Das bedeutet null Laufzeit-Overhead, keine Abhängigkeitskonflikte und volle Transparenz: Sie können jede Anweisung vor der Installation lesen und prüfen.
Kompatibilität
Dieser Skill funktioniert mit jedem KI-Coding-Agenten, der das skills.sh-Format unterstützt, einschließlich Claude Code (Anthropic), Cursor, Windsurf, Cline, Aider und anderen Tools, die projektbezogene Kontextdateien lesen. Skills sind auf Transportebene framework-agnostisch — der Inhalt bestimmt, für welche Sprache oder welches Framework er gilt.
Data sourced from the skills.sh registry and GitHub. Install counts and security audits are updated regularly.